As much as neo-conservative/Zionist ideologues like Robert Kagan write about the exceptional inevitability of the American world order, there is a general sinking feeling among the people of the United States that this country does not have a future.
Is this impression justified? Students of imperial decline can examine historical observations and parallels to decide.
Admittedly, utilizing historicism to try and predict geopolitical developments in the short and medium term is an imperfect science, often taking the form of prejudiced soothsaying or intuitive assertions.

正如Robert Kagan等新保守主義/猶太復國主義理論家所寫的那樣,“美國世界秩序杰出”的必然性在美國人民中普遍存在一種沉淪的感覺,即這個國家沒有未來。
這種印象有道理嗎?研究帝國衰亡的學生可以通過歷史觀察和相似之處來決定。
誠然,利用歷史決定論試圖預測短期和中期的地緣政治發展是一門不完美的科學,往往會采取帶有偏見的預言或直覺斷言的形式。

Part of the problem is an overreliance on ancient history, particularly Rome, as a reference point for understanding the rise and fall of empire. The lack of specific data regarding the developments that culminated in Rome’s downfall has led to subsequent commentators to fill in the blanks through the ideological prisms of their time. For example, 18th-century British historian Edward Gibbon singled out the Roman elite’s behavioral decadence as the catalyst for its downfall. Individual moral purity was a strong fixation for Protestant Englishmen like Gibbons during his time, but this theory can be challenged by information revealing widescale moral excesses among Roman rulers during the lead up and fruition of the empire’s 2nd Century AD territorial peak, e.g., the infamously obscene Caligula or Nero. Today, narratives blaming climate change for Rome’s decline, a 21st century obsession, have gained a foothold.

問題的部分原因在于,人們過于依賴古代歷史,尤其是羅馬歷史,將其作為理解帝國興衰的參照點。由于缺乏具體的數據來說明導致羅馬滅亡的發展,導致后來的評論家們通過他們那個時代的意識形態棱鏡來填補空白。
例如,18世紀英國歷史學家Edward Gibbon指出,羅馬精英的行為墮落是其垮臺的催化劑。在他的時代,像Gibbon這樣的新教英國人對個人道德的純潔有著強烈的執著,但這一理論可能會受到挑戰,因為有信息顯示,在公元2世紀帝國領土高峰的前期和后期,羅馬統治者普遍存在道德上的過度行為。
例如臭名昭著的、猥瑣的卡利古拉或尼祿。如今,將羅馬衰落歸咎于氣候變化的說法——21世紀的執念——已經站穩了腳跟。

A more direct comparison with the downfall of the Soviet unx, where detailed information is available, is more useful in seeking to investigate the malaise and long-term viability of the America empire. The United States of 2024 shares several demographic trends with the Soviet unx of the 1970s — “the era of stagnation” — that ultimately led to the vast Eurasian superpower’s implosion in 1991.
When examining the short to medium term (10 to 30 years) prognosis of the American empire, we will also contrast it with its major adversaries: primarily Russia and China, and, supplementally (more so in later articles), Iran.

更直接的比較是,蘇聯的垮臺 (對此有詳細的信息),在尋求調查美帝國的萎靡和長期生存能力方面更有用。2024年的美國與20世紀70年代的蘇聯(“停滯時代”)有幾個人口趨勢相同,這最終導致了這個龐大的歐亞超級大國在1991年的內爆。
在研究美帝國的中短期(10到30年)預測時,我們還將把它與它的主要對手進行對比:主要是俄羅斯和中國,以及補充(在后面的文章中更多)伊朗。

This author stresses that it is under no impression that either Russia, China, or Iran can defeat the American empire on their own. All three countries have different advantages over the United States in their world-historical struggle against neo-liberal unipolarity, but also disadvantages as individual contenders, suggesting that a future without Pax Americana could be a pre-WWII one limited to natural spheres of influence rather than a recreation of Washington’s ambitious efforts for world domination. If the three powers coordinate and unite — as China and Russia’s “no limits” partnership or the two powers’ multi-year pacts with Iran suggest they have — the Washington-led, post-war liberal world order may go down sooner than we expect.

作者強調,沒有人認為俄羅斯、中國或伊朗可以憑一己之力打敗美帝國。與美國相比,這三個國家在反對新自由主義單極的世界歷史斗爭中具有不同的優勢,但作為單獨的競爭者也有不利之處。這表明沒有美國治下的、和平的未來,可能是二戰前的那種局限于自然勢力范圍的未來,而不是華盛頓統治世界的雄心勃勃的重現。
如果這三個大國協調一致——就像中國和俄羅斯的“無限制”伙伴關系,或者這兩個大國與伊朗的多年協議所表明的那樣——華盛頓領導的戰后自由世界秩序可能會比我們預期的更快瓦解。

Russia and China remain behind America on a wide array of metrics, but what is impossible to deny is that they are starting to catch up while the United States is broadly at an inflection point. In 2021, *** made this point in his address, affirming that “time and momentum” were on China’s side.
One logical point to make is that, generally speaking, life for ordinary Russian and Chinese people is obxtively getting better, while things are getting demonstrably worse in American. This alone can create divergences in national morale during a great power competition.
The economic, military, soft power, political, and other factors pointing to the coming failure and geopolitical neutralization of the US and its ideology on the world stage will be explored in future articles.

俄羅斯和中國在許多指標上仍落后于美國,但不可否認的是,當美國大體處于拐點時,它們正開始迎頭趕上。2021年,中國領導在講話中強調了這一點,肯定“時間和勢頭”站在中國一邊。
一個合乎邏輯的觀點是,總的來說,俄羅斯和中國普通民眾的生活客觀上正在變得更好,而美國的情況卻明顯變得更糟。僅這一點就能在大國競爭中造成國家士氣的分歧。
經濟、軍事、軟實力、政治和其他因素將導致美國及其意識形態在世界舞臺上的失敗和地緣政治中立,(對此,)我們將在以后的文章中探討。

原創翻譯:龍騰網 http://www.ribblestockfxtrade.com 轉載請注明出處


Part I: Demographics
One of the first symptoms of a nation’s decline is a breakdown in social and human health. Often small changes in data related to population well-being speaks to an underwater iceberg of more significant and systematic problems within a people.
At the hump of the USSR’s “Brezhnev stagnation” in the mid to late 1970s, demographers began speculating about the health of the once seemingly omnipotent empire after discovering that the nation’s rates of infant mortality were beginning to rise. Though this increase was minor — only a few percentage points — it broke a cycle of decades of rapid gains in the survivability of Soviet infants since the end of World War II.

第一部分:人口統計
一個國家衰落的最初癥狀之一是社會和人類健康的崩潰。與人口福利有關的數據的微小變化往往反映了一個民族內部更重大的制度性問題的水下冰山。
在蘇聯“勃列日涅夫停滯”的上世紀70年代中后期,人口統計學家發現蘇聯的嬰兒死亡率開始上升,于是開始猜測這個曾經看似無所不能的帝國的健康狀況。盡管這一增長幅度很小——只有幾個百分點——但它打破了自二戰結束以來蘇聯嬰兒存活率持續數十年快速增長的循環。

原創翻譯:龍騰網 http://www.ribblestockfxtrade.com 轉載請注明出處


This was perplexing to mainstream observers at the time, as the Soviet unx was, financially, enjoying relative prosperity due to a global oil export boom triggered by the Arab League’s 1973 oil embargo. The USSR under Leonid Brezhnev (who ruled from 1964-1982) planned its economy to become a military peer of the United States (especially in the realm of nuclear weapons), was industrially powerful, and matched or led its rivals in the world in various cutting-edge fields, such as aerospace.
Yet despite the superficial success of the system, the USSR’s most important asset, its people, began showing signs of decay and misery.

這讓當時的主流觀察家感到困惑,因為1973年阿拉伯聯盟的石油禁運引發了全球石油出口的繁榮,蘇聯在財政上相對繁榮。列昂尼德·勃列日涅夫(1964年至1982年執政)領導下的蘇聯,計劃將其經濟發展成為美國的軍事對手(特別是在核武器領域),工業實力雄厚,在航空航天等各種尖端領域與世界上的競爭對手匹敵或領先。
然而,盡管該體系表面上取得了成功,但蘇聯最重要的資產——人民——開始顯示出衰敗和痛苦的跡象。

Today in the United States, we are seeing similar patterns.
In the Soviet context, Central Asian Minorities within the multi-ethnic Soviet space, who benefited from special economic, social and legal privileges (before America, the Bolsheviks of the Soviet unx created the first nation to practice official racial discriminate against its own ethnic majority citizens, as detailed in Terry Martin’s 2001 book The Affirmative Action Empire), grew at much faster rates than the less fertile Slavic population during the 1960s and 70s. By 1979, ethnic Russians declined to barely 52% of the Soviet population.
As Robert D. Putnam’s 2000 book Bowling Alone has shown, multiculturalism/ multiracialism is strongly correlated with alienation and distrust. As in the USSR in its period of downturn, America’s racial makeup has radically changed in the last 50 years, with white people now making up less than 58% of the population.

今天在美國,我們看到了類似的模式。
在蘇聯的背景下,多民族蘇聯空間中的中亞少數民族,他們受益于特殊的經濟,社會和法律特權(在美國之前,蘇聯的布爾什維克創建了第一個對自己的多數民族公民實行官方種族歧視的國家,如Terry Martin 2001年的書《平權行動帝國》所述),在20世紀60年代和70年代,其人口增長速度遠遠快于生育能力較差的斯拉夫人口。到1979年,俄羅斯族在蘇聯人口中的比例下降到52%。
正如Robert D. Putnam在2000年出版的《獨自打保齡球》一書中所表明的那樣,多元文化主義/多種族主義與異化和不信任密切相關。就像蘇聯在衰退時期一樣,美國的種族構成在過去的50年里發生了根本性的變化,白人現在占總人口的比例不到58%。

Besides the national problems created by racial and cultural alienation, changes in demographics lead to changes to a society overall. Nations naturally begin taking on the character of the home countries of the new people who populate them, which in the American context means falling behind peripheries of its empire, such as Western Europe, in critical sectors. This is another commonality with the 1970s USSR, where the Soviet homeland itself was racked with dysfunction and living standards were falling behind ethnically/racially homogenous Warsaw Pact protectorates such as Hungary or East Germany. It may be possible for non-white, non-Asian nations to achieve success, but this would require illiberal governance, ethno-cultural cohesion and enforced discipline that thoroughly multi-racial countries (like America or Brazil) appear to lack.

除了種族和文化異化造成的國家問題外,人口結構的變化還會導致整個社會的變化。國家自然會開始呈現新移民母國的特征,在美國的背景下,這意味著在關鍵領域落后于其帝國的外圍地區,比如西歐。
這是與20世紀70年代的蘇聯的另一個共同點,當時蘇聯本土本身就受到功能失調的困擾,生活水平落后于民族同質的、華沙條約受保護國如匈牙利或東德。非白人、非亞洲國家或許有可能取得成功,但這需要非自由主義的治理、民族文化凝聚力和強制紀律,而這些似乎是完全多種族的國家(如美國或巴西)所缺乏的。

Predictably, it is no coincidence that the United States is facing falling living standards and social degradation, including among the once prosperous white majority, which place it at a grave disadvantage against geopolitical competitors.
In 2022, the Center for Disease Control reported that American infant mortality rose 3% for the first time in decades, from 5.44 infant deaths per 1,000 live births the previous year to 5.60. In 2023, no ground was made up in tackling this problem: the same figure was reported.
Comparatively, Russia’s infant mortality is now lower. In 2023, there were 4.807 deaths per 1,000 live births, a 3.8% decline from 2022. This is a remarkable feat of the Vladimir Putin government. In 2003, early in Putin’s reign, Russia suffered an alarming 16.156 deaths per 1,000 live births, while the United States had an infant morbidity rate of 6.85 at this time.

可以預見的是,美國正面臨生活水平下降和社會退化,包括曾經富裕的白人多數在內。這并非巧合,這使美國在面對地緣政治競爭對手時處于嚴重劣勢。
2022年,美國疾病控制中心報告稱,美國嬰兒死亡率幾十年來首次上升3%,從前一年的每1000名活產嬰兒死亡5.44人上升到5.60人。2023年,在解決這一問題方面沒有取得任何進展:報道的數字是相同的。
相比之下,俄羅斯現在的嬰兒死亡率更低。2023年,每千名活產嬰兒中有4.807人死亡,比2022年下降3.8%。這是弗拉基米爾·普京政府的一項非凡成就。2003年,普京執政初期,俄羅斯每1000名活產嬰兒中就有16.156人死亡,而美國同期的嬰兒死亡率為6.85。

On the Chinese front, their massive population lags behind the US with 8.4 infants dying per 1,000 births. We can consult with ***’s quote about “momentum” here. China has seen this statistic consistently falling by over 3% every year, as America suffers the inverse, suggesting that like Russia they can be forecasted to overcome this hurdle.
Much of this rise in infant mortality correlates with the increase in America’s minority population. Blacks and Amerindians in particular have high rates of infant mortality due to neglectful activities such as drug use, alcoholism, abuse, as well as overburdened or poorly administered minority-run health care services. At the same time, the infant mortality rate is going up for white mothers as well, suggesting that these symptoms of deterioration are harming the white American community as well.

在中國方面,他們龐大的人口落后于美國,每1000名新生兒中有8.4名嬰兒死亡。中國的這一統計數據每年持續下降超過3%,而美國則相反,這表明可以預測他們會像俄羅斯一樣克服這一障礙。
嬰兒死亡率的上升在很大程度上與美國少數民族人口的增加有關。黑人和美洲印第安人的嬰兒死亡率尤其高,原因是吸毒、酗酒、濫用藥物等被忽視的活動,以及少數民族經營的醫療服務負擔過重或管理不善。與此同時,白人母親的嬰兒死亡率也在上升,這表明這些惡化的癥狀也在傷害美國白人社區。

This withering of fundamental life measures is part of a broader trend. From 2019 to 2023, US life expectancy fell from 79 years to now 76. This figure is more at home among developing nations than those we consider advanced. Among developed US liberal peers, Germany’s current life expectancy is 82 years, UK 82, France 83, and so on.
Following a modest increase from 2022 to 2023, Chinese life expectancy now surpasses that of Americans, at 77 years, a historic first for China. Russia, which is fighting a brutal war in Ukraine, still saw an increase in life expectancy from 2022 to 2023: 72 to 73.
Returning to 2003 numbers, the American life expectancy was 77, while China’s was 73 and Russia’s 65.

這種基本生活標準的消亡是一個更大趨勢的一部分。從2019年到2023年,美國人的預期壽命從79歲降至現在的76歲。這一數字在發展中國家比我們認為的發達國家更為普遍。在美國的自由主義發達國家中,德國目前的預期壽命為82歲,英國為82歲,法國為83歲,依此類推。
從2022年到2023年,中國人的預期壽命略有增加,現在超過了美國人,達到77歲,這是中國歷史上的第一次。俄羅斯雖然正在烏克蘭打一場殘酷的戰爭,但從2022年到2023年,俄羅斯人的預期壽命仍然有所增加:72歲到73歲。
回到2003年的數據,美國人的預期壽命是77歲,而中國是73歲,俄羅斯是65歲。

When comparing Soviet data during the era of stagnation, we again see a similarity with the US. The politburo began internally ringing alarm bells when they discovered that life expectancy suddenly fell in a form similar to the US, from 69.5 in 1971 to 67.9 in 1978, a fact publicly disclosed to much controversy during Perestroika and Glasnost.
America’s dwindling life expectancy and rising infant mortality, as in the case of the Soviet unx, is being fueled by an explosion in substance abuse, obesity, suicide, institutional failures, and other informal measures of nihilism and despair rooted in anomie.
In the year 2023, there were a whopping 112,000 drug overdose deaths, primarily among the young.

當比較蘇聯在經濟停滯時期的數據時,我們再次看到了與美國的相似之處。當政治局發現預期壽命突然下降,從1971年的69.5歲降至1978年的67.9歲時,他們開始在內部敲響警鐘,這一事實在改革和開放期間被公開披露,引發了許多爭議。
美國人預期壽命的縮短和嬰兒死亡率的上升,就像蘇聯的情況一樣,是由藥物濫用、肥胖、自殺、制度失敗以及其他植根于反常的虛無主義和絕望的非正式衡量標準的激增所推動的。
在2023年,有高達112,000人死于藥物過量,主要是年輕人。

This dwarfs Russia, which itself is seen to have a drug problem. During a recent surge in drug overdoses in 2021, the nation with less than half the US population suffered 7,316 fatal ODs, driven in part by boredom or loneliness during COVID.
In China, with its population of 1.4 billion and with its historic crisis of opium addiction in the rearview mirror, the rate of drug-related deaths is approximately 49,000 per year.
In the realm of suicide, Russia has long had the reputation of being a world leader in this category, but the US has now quietly surpassed it.
In 2021, Russia suffered 10.7 self-inflicted deaths per 100,000 people. In the same year, the United States’ rate jumped to 14.04 per 100,000.
By comparison, in the year 2000, Russians committed suicide at the rate of 39 deaths per 100k, so their new figures are a massive leap forward when tackling the issue.

這讓俄羅斯相形見絀,俄羅斯本身也被認為存在藥物濫用問題。在最近2021年藥物過量激增期間,這個人口不到美國一半的國家遭受了7316例致命的藥物過量,部分原因是新冠疫情期間的無聊或孤獨。
中國有14億人口,鴉片成癮的歷史性危機已經過去,與毒品/藥品有關的死亡率約為每年49 000人。
在自殺領域,俄羅斯長期以來一直享有世界領先的聲譽,但美國現在已經悄然超越了它。2021年,俄羅斯每10萬人中有10.7人自殺。同年,美國的自殺率躍升至每10萬人有14.04 人。
相比之下,在2000年,俄羅斯人的自殺率為每10萬人中有39人死亡,因此他們的新數據在解決這一問題方面是一個巨大的飛躍。

In America, we are suffering an astonishing step backwards. In 2000, Americans were 40% less likely to kill themselves, with the rate of 10.4 per 100,000.
For China, suicide rates have declined from 10.88 to 5.25 between 2010 and 2021.
In the world of serious mental illness, the United States is also one upping its rivals.
In 2022, approximately 5% of Americans suffered from severe mental disorders, such as psychosis or schizophrenia, while 1 out of 5 US citizens are being medically treated for milder forms like clinical depression.
In Russia, around 8.8% of citizens are diagnosed with clinical depression. Only 0.3% of Russians are schizophrenics. This is another sharp statistical decrease from the recent Russian past.
It will come to nobody’s surprise that Americans are the most obese in the world, a key co-morbidity accelerating these demographic problems. This does not require number crunching.

在美國,我們正在遭受驚人的倒退。在2000年,美國人自殺的可能性比現在低40%,每10萬人中有10.4人自殺。
2010年至2021年間,中國的自殺率從10.88降至5.25。
在嚴重精神疾病的世界里,美國也是領先對手的國家之一。到2022年,大約5%的美國人患有嚴重的精神障礙,如精神病或精神分裂癥,而五分之一的美國公民正在接受臨床抑郁癥等較輕微形式的治療。
在俄羅斯,大約8.8%的公民被診斷患有臨床抑郁癥。只有0.3%的俄羅斯人患有精神分裂癥。這是最近俄羅斯統計數據上的又一次急劇下降。
毫無疑問,美國人是世界上最肥胖的人,這是加速這些人口問題的關鍵并發癥。這并不需要數字計算。
(未完待續)